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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

)

vs.

)
Dist. Court No. 101902812

MANUEL HURTADO RINCON,

)
App. Ct. No. 20110897

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated September 9, 2011. The
Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of Identity Fraud, a second degree felony,
in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-1102. He was sentenced by the Honorable Michael
Direda to an indeterminate term of not less than one year or more than fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(e). Defendant has been
deported to Mexico.

1
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ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON VAGUE
AND UNCLEAR STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF THE OFFENSE
OF IDENTITY FRAUD?
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the Defendant filing the
Motion to Dismiss and renewing the issue at the bench trial regarding the issues
addressed in the Motion to Dismiss on August 31, 2011. (R. 072/7-8; R. 033)
Standard of Review. This is a mixed question of fact and law. The trial court's
legal conclusion should be reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the
trial court's conclusion. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)1. The trial
court's findings of fact should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of
review. "[QJuestions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's
factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196 (Utah 1995).
POINT II
BASED UPON THE VAGUENESS OF THE STATUTE AND
PLAIN LANGUAGE, WAS THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED AT
TRIAL BY THE STATE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF IDENTITY FRAUD?

1

Abrogated on other grounds, see, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. 2001 UT 89,113, 65 P.3d 1134,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Preservation of Issue: The issue was preserved by the filing of an appeal from the
verdict of a bench trial. (R. 068)
Standard of Review: " When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence,
we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.' " Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT
App 61, Tf5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted). "However, 'before we can uphold a
conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element
of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (citation omitted). We review the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994), State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FIFTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Persons
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved
usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in hw, or are defined by statute, are
to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
§76-6-1102. Identity Fraud
(2)

(a) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person:
(i) obtains personal identifying information of another person whether that
person is alive or deceased; and
(ii) knowingly or intentionally uses, or attempts to use, that information with
fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services,
employment, any other thing of value, or medical information.
(b) It is not a defense to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) that the person did not
know that the personal information belonged to another person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b)(ii), a third degree felony if the value
of the credit, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of value is less than
$5,000; or
(b) a second degree felony if:
(i) the value of the credit, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of
value is or exceeds $5,000; or
(ii) the use described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii) of personal identifying information
results, directly or indirectly, in bodily injury to another person.
§76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive sentences —
Definitions.
(1) (a) (i) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without
lawful authorization.
(ii) If a prisoner obtains authorization to leave official custody by means of
deceit, fraud, or other artifice, the prisoner has not received lawful authorization.
(b) Escape under this Subsection (1) is a third degree felony except as provided
under Subsection (l)(c).
(c) Escape under this Subsection (1) is a second degree felony if:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(i) the actor escapes from a state prison; or
(ii) (A) the actor is convicted as a party to the offense, as defined in Section 762-202; and
(B) the actor is an employee at or a volunteer of a law enforcement agency, the
Department of Corrections, a county or district attorney's office, the office of the
state attorney general, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or the courts, the Judicial
Council, the Office of the Court Administrator, or similar administrative units in
the judicial branch of government.
(2) (a) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes
serious bodily injury to another.
(b) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony.
(3) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section shall
run consecutively with any other sentence.
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Confinement" means the prisoner is:
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a contract with the
Utah Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed and the
sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or housed in a
county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Escape" is considered to be a continuing activity commencing with the
conception of the design to escape and continuing until the escaping prisoner is
returned to official custody or the prisoner's attempt to escape is thwarted or
abandoned.
(c) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of juvenile
offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is
not on parole. A person is considered confined in the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from work
release or home visit by the time designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation;
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, pursuant to a
contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by correctional officers.
(d) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes persons
under trusty status.
5
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(e) "Volunteer" means any person who donates service without pay or other
compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved by the
supervising agency.
§78A-4-103(2)(e) Court of Appeals Jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in the Second District Court of Weber County
with Identity Fraud, a second degree felony. (R. 001-002) An Evidentiary hearing
was held on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on April 5, 2011. (R. 044) A bench
trial was held August 31, 2011, before the Honorable Michael Direda. (R. 072) At
that trial, Defendant was convicted of Identity Fraud, a second degree felony. The
Defendant was sentenced on September 9, 2011, to an indeterminate term of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The final order was signed on September 9,
2011. (R. 062) The Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 6, 2011.
(R.068) The Defendant has since been deported to Mexico.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A woman by the name of Gertrude Willison had applied for unemployment
in the state of Nevada after being laid off of a job at Sierra Nevada Corporation.
(R. 072/15) Ms. Willison had applied for benefits in May 2010 and received
6
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benefits though November 1, 2010. (R. 072/15) Once November arrived, Ms.
Willison called Social Security to extend her unemployment benefits. (R. 072/15)
The claims representative she spoke with told her that based upon her Social
Security Number, she was working in Ogden, Utah, for Jay Morgan Confections;
and her unemployment benefits were terminated. (R. 072/15) Ms. Willison had
never worked in Ogden, Utah; and based upon her unemployment benefits being
terminated, Ms. Willison contacted the Phoenix, Arizona Police Department to file
a report. (R. 072/16) Ms. Willison was able to reinstate her unemployment benefits
one month later. (R. 072/16)
Ms. Willison contacted the Ogden Police Department, and Detective Richard
Childress was assigned to the case. (R. 072/21) Detective Childress contacted
Workforce Services and found the Social Security number provided by Ms.
Willison was linked to a Mr. Hurtado or Mr. Rincon who was employed at Jay
Morgan Confections in Ogden, Utah. (R. 072/22) Detective Childress spoke with
the president of Jay Morgan and was provided a W-4 form that indicated the Social
Security number was being used by Mr. Manuel Hurtado Rincon.
Upon interview with Mr. Rincon, Mr. Rincon stated that he had used the
number in California and Utah for the purpose of employment and that he had
made up the number years ago for the purpose of work. (R. 072/25, 43) Mr.
Rincon testified that he never purchased the number from anyone. (R. 072/45) He
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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further testified he had never taken or seen identification with that Social Security
number on it aside from his documents, which consisted of an IRS tax
identification card, and that he simply made the number up in his head. (R. 072/4345)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, that the Statute of Identity
Fraud is constitutionally vague. The word "obtain" in the Identity Fraud Statute
implies that an overt act, such as dumpster diving, is required to be found guilty of
Identity Fraud. Here, Defendant believed that as long as he did not perform an
overt act, such as theft, looking over someone's shoulder, etc., to come up with a
Social Security number, then he is not in violation of Identity Fraud. The statutory
language of Identity Fraud is such that individuals or reasonable knowledge and
experience would be confused with such language.
Second, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the
Defendant violated each element of the offense of Identity Fraud. The State was
unable to show Defendant obtained, based upon an overt act, the Social Security
number and that he had knowledge that what he was doing was in violation of the
law.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON
VAGUE AND UNCLEAR STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF
THE OFFENSE OF IDENTITY FRAUD.
The Utah and U.S. Supreme Courts have continually held that "a statute is
unconstitutionally vague" if a the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of
ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the
law," or if the ambiguity in the law "encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions." Due South, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2008
UT 71, 93; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
The Utah Code §76-6-1102, lists out the elements of Identity Fraud. That
statute reads:
76-6-1102. Identity fraud crime.
(2) (a) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person:
(i) obtains personal identifying information of another person
whether that person is alive or deceased; and
(ii) knowingly or intentionally uses, or attempts to use, that
information with fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to
obtain, credit, goods, services, employment, any other thing of value,
or medical information.
Utah case law further defines the elements of Identity Fraud in State v.
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, as stating, "Identity fraud requires proof that the
defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly; (2) obtained personal identifying
9
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information of another person without that person's authorization; and (3) used or
attempted to use that personal identifying information "with fraudulent intent,
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, ... [or] any other thing of
value ... in the name of another person without the consent of that person." Id.
In the present case, the State failed to prove that the second element of
Identity Fraud occurred without reasonable doubt. While courts require that a
quantum of evidence be presented at trial, the only evidence the state presented
was testimony of a witness that stated her Social Security number had been used.
There was no witness or proof presented that showed the Defendant did an overt
act to constitute obtaining.
Based upon the reading of the Identity Fraud statute and upon the reading of
Federal and Utah State case law, charging and convicting a defendant of Identity
Fraud would be unreasonable and unconstitutional based upon the plain language
of the statue, the vagueness of the statute and defendant's lack of knowledge.
Plain Language. The statute of Identity Fraud first requires that "a person
obtain personal identifying information of another." UCA §76-6-1102(2)(a).
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "obtain" as: to get hold of by effort; to
get possession of. The Dictionary® further defines "obtain" as: "To succeed in
gaining possession of as the result of planning or endeavor; acquire." Clearly the
word "obtain" implies that a person must obtain information by an act, effort, or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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some movement of the persons being that would result in them taking, looking, or
finding identifying information and then using said information to commit the
crime of Identity Fraud.
In the present case, Defendant had come to the U.S.A. and was searching for
employment. Defendant had never met Gertrude Willison; had never seen any
identifying documents regarding Ms. Willison; in fact, Defendant had never even
been in the same state as Ms. Willison. Defendant had simply crafted up a nine
digit number. He made no effort to steal the number, he made no effort to look
over a person's shoulder to get the information, and he simply invented a number
that he believed belonged to no one.
Based upon the plain language of the statute, the statute would require that
the Defendant "obtain personal identifying information" through effort, such as an
individual obtains a degree, or that you obtain goals - each imply work and effort.
In this case, there was no effort or overt act which resulted in obtaining the
information. The Utah Appellate Court in State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217,
stated that: "In considering the plain language of a statute, courts 'presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Id. In the present case, the plain meaning of the
word "obtained" requires that there be some overt act or effort to get the

11
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information. Making up a nine-digit number would not rise to the definition of
"obtain."
In the Germonto case, the court looked at the plain language of Utah's
escape statute. The Defendant in that case argued that there was not a plain
meaning of the word "official custody." However, the Court held that the statute
plainly states that "[a] prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody
without authorization."

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-309(1). Subsection (7)(b) defines

"official custody" as "confinement in the state prison." The court ultimately held
that the statute did sufficiently define the word "official custody" and the plain
meaning was clear.
Using the Germonto court's analysis, the word "obtain" again implies that
there has to be an act or effort in order to commit the crime. Further, in the statute
it requires knowledge to the use of the information. In the case at bar, there was no
intent or desire to obtain a specific person's information; rather, the Defendant just
made up a nine-digit number, and the plain language of the statute is unclear and
therefore unconstitutional.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 129 S.Ct.
1886 (2009), explained how the wording of a statute requires a reading in plain
language. In Flores-Figueroa, the issue revolved around identity theft and the
word knowledge in the statute. The Supreme Court stated, "The manner in which
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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the courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes is fully consistent with the ordinary
English usage." Id.
In the present case, the ordinary English usage would imply that some act or
effort is necessary to obtain specific information. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-11 lists
out rules of construction. In that statute it reads, "Words and phrases are to be
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but
technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court in Herold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2011
UT 18, 251 P.3d 804, stated: "When interpreting statutes, our "'primary objective
... is to give effect to the legislature's intent.' To discern legislative intent, 4we look
first to the statute's plain language.'"

In doing so, "[w]e presume that the

legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning." Additionally, " [w]e read the plain language of the statute
as a whole [ ] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the
same chapter." "When the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its
language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id.
Here, if we were to apply the rules of construction and look to the legislative
intent though the plain meaning of the word, it would be clear that the legislature
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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specifically used the word "obtain" to prevent theft of an actual "person's"
identifying information. For example, in U.C.A. §76-6-1102, the statute in
question, the term "person" is specifically used multiple times regarding the
"person's" information, whether that "person" is alive or deceased. Clearly, the
intent of the statute is to prevent instances such as stealing a wallet for personal
information, dumpster diving for information, or looking over a person's shoulder
to obtain said information. Although it is not a defense that the individual did not
know the number belonged to anyone, there is no reference to simply inventing a
number or the illegality of crafting up your own number without going out to
obtain said information. Based upon the plain language of the statute and the word
"obtain," Defendant should not have been convicted of the crime Identity Fraud.
Vagueness. In addition to looking at the plain language of the statute, the
statute is unconstitutionally vague. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. MacGuire,
2004 UT 4, listed out requirements that are necessary to determine whether a
statute is vague. The MacGuire Court stated. "In order to establish that the ...
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that
the statutes do not provide "the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to
understand what conduct [is prohibited]," or (2) that the statutes "encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Due South, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 2008 UT 71, stated: "A statute is unconstitutionally vague if
the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are
unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law," or if the ambiguity in
the law "encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Id. In Due
South Inc., the Court ultimately held that the statute regarding serving alcohol to
patrons was not unconstitutionally vague because it was not a strict liability statute,
stating that the servers are only liable if they intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly permit another to drink to a degree they may endanger themselves or
another. Id.
The Court further indicated in State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, that:
"[V]agueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether
the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT
73, f 13.

"As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a

penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id.
In the case at bar, if Defendant were to read the statute it states that he would
have to obtain personal identifying information. A person of reasonable
intelligence would be inclined to understand that as, "I may not steal identifying
15 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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information." Here, Defendant invented a nine-digit number, he did not steal it, he
did not look over someone's shoulder to get the information, he merely crafted up
a number believing it belonged to no one and did not act with the requisite intent
required by the statute. Applying the MacGuire court's analysis to this case, (1)
the statute does not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to
understand what conduct is prohibited. Based upon the standards set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court, the statute of identity fraud is unconstitutionally vague in that
it does not allow an individual of ordinary intelligence to understand what is
prohibited.
Defendant's Knowledge. The prosecution argued in the trial court, and may
argue before this Court, that Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1102(3) overcomes the
defense position in this particular case. That section provides: "it is not a defense
to a violation of subsection 2(a) that the person did not know that the personal
information belonged to another person." The prosecution, however, misconstrues
the Defendant's position in that respect. The Defendant submits that the plain
reading of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1102(2(a) still requires the prosecution to prove
that the Defendant "obtained" the personal identifying information of another as a
specific element of the offense. The fact that the Defendant did not obtain this
number, but rather created a number, falls outside the parameters of the offense as
set forth by the Utah Legislature. This position is supported by a Supreme Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the United States decision in the case of Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1886
(2009), wherein the Court ruled on an almost identical case to the case at bar and
held "that in order to convict a defendant of aggravated identity theft for
"knowingly transfer [ring], possess [ing], or us[ing], without lawful authority, a
means of identification of another person," government must prove that defendant
knew that "means of identification" he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or
used did, in fact, belong to another person." Id.
The facts of Flores-Figueroa were that Defendant was a citizen of Mexico.
In 2000, to gain employment, Defendant gave his employer a false name, birthday
and Social Security number, along with a counterfeit alien registration card. The
numbers on the Social Security card and the alien registration card were not those
of a real person. In 2006, Defendant presented his employer with new counterfeit
Social Security and alien registration cards; these cards used his real name. But
this time the numbers on both cards were in fact numbers assigned to other people.
Defendant's employer reported this information, and Customs discovered the
numbers belonged to other people. The United States then charged Defendant with
aggravated identity theft. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that, "In order to convict defendant of
aggravated identity theft for knowingly transfer [ring], possessing], or us[ing],
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, government
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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must prove that defendant knew that means of identification he or she unlawfully
transferred, possessed, or used did, in fact, belong to another person, as opposed to
being a counterfeit; it is not enough for government to show that defendant knew
that he or she was transferring, possessing, or using a means of identification
without lawful authority, unless government also shows that defendant knew that
this means of identification belonged to another person." Flores-Figueroa v. U.S.,
129S.Ct. 1886(2009).
In the present case, Defendant stated that he was unaware that the Social
Security number he used belonged to another person. Defendant did not gain the
information from a document; he simply made up a nine digit number. There is no
evidence that Defendant knew the number belonged to Gertrude Willison or any
other person, he even stated he just made the number up. (R. 072/45) Thus, by the
Flores case law, Defendant should not have been charged with identity fraud based
upon the knowledge element required for the crime.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Flores paid great attention to what our legal
system has long held important which is beyond a reasonable doubt. In Flores, the
court looked at the arguments from the Government and stated:
"Finally, and perhaps of greatest practical importance, there is the
difficulty in many circumstances of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant has the necessary knowledge. Take an
instance in which an alien who unlawfully entered the United States
gives an employer identification documents that in fact belong to
others. How is the Government to prove that the defendant knew that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this was so? The Government may be able to show that such a
defendant knew the papers were not his. But perhaps the defendant
did not care whether the papers (1) were real papers belonging to
another person or (2) were simply counterfeit papers. The
difficulties of proof along with the defendant's necessary guilt of a
predicate crime and the defendant's necessary knowledge that he has
acted "without lawful authority," make it reasonable, in the
Government's view, to read the statute's language as dispensing
with the knowledge requirement."
The U.S. Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1886
(2009) then went on to explain the errors in the Government's position and
held:
We do not find this argument sufficient, however, to turn the tide
in the Government's favor. For one thing, in the classic case of
identity theft, intent is generally not difficult to prove. For example,
where a defendant has used another person's identification
information to get access to that person's bank account, the
Government can prove knowledge with little difficulty. The same is
true when the defendant has gone through someone else's trash to
find discarded credit card and bank statements, or pretends to be
from the victim's bank and requests personal identifying
information. Indeed, the examples of identity theft in the legislative
history (dumpster diving, computer hacking, and the like) are all
examples of the types of classic identity theft where intent should be
relatively easy to prove, and there will be no practical enforcement
problem. For another thing, to the extent that Congress may have
been concerned about criminalizing the conduct of a broader class of
individuals, the concerns about practical enforceability are
insufficient to outweigh the clarity of the text. Similar interpretations
that we have given other similarly phrased statutes also created
practical enforcement problems but had Congress placed conclusive
weight upon practical enforcement, the statute would likely not read
the way it now reads. Instead, Congress used the word "knowingly"
followed by a list of offense elements. And we cannot find
indications in statements of its purpose or in the practical problems
of enforcement sufficient to overcome the ordinary meaning, in
19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

English or through ordinary interpretive practice, of the words that it
wrote." Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1886 (2009).
Thus, in order to convict a defendant of a crime such as identity theft or
fraud which has an element of knowledge, the government must show that the
defendant knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to another person
or at least could have belonged to another person.
In the present case, Defendant did not have the knowledge required by the
statute, nor did he have the "knowledge to obtain" as spoken of in the case of State
v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155. Defendant had no intent to steal identifying
information from another nor did he then use any information for a purpose such as
accessing another's bank account. Instead, Defendant believed he was the only
user of the Social Security number and used the number strictly for productive
means such as obtaining work and building credit. Such use and such lack of
knowledge does not rise to the offense of Identity Fraud and does not meet the
requirement stated in Green, which requires that a statute adequately give notice of
what is proscribed in a way ordinary people can understand the prohibited conduct.
Here, Defendant did not have a criminal intent and did not have knowledge that
creating a number that he believed belonged to no one was Identity Fraud. The
statute of Identity Fraud does not make it clear as to whether or not inventing a
number constitutes a violation of said offense.
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POINT II
BASED UPON THE VAGUENESS OF THE STATUTE AND
PLAIN LANGUAGE, THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED AT
TRIAL BY THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
THE DEFENDANT OF IDENTITY FRAUD.
The due process clause (see the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution)
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In
Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In the case at bar, the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.

An appellate court should only overturn a

conviction for insufficient evidence "when it is apparent that there is not sufficient
competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to ,
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, % 12, 985 P.2d 911.
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is
limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, f 22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58, ^J 67, 27 P.3d
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1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984
(Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess
credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in
favor of the jury verdict." Id.
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court may
overturn a conviction. State v. Workman, infra at 985. Furthermore, in the case of
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's conviction of evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert
testimony that opined that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder
of an individual, although no physical evidence was provided. In reversing that
conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that; [the defendant] had the
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it
ever existed. Id. at \ 18.
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the verdict cannot be supported. It is undisputed that a
Social Security number was used for employment purposes. However, the State
was never able to provide any evidence that showed that Defendant performed an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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overt act to obtain the number illegally. It is undisputed that the number was
simply invented. In the absence of any evidence that the Defendant obtained the
Social Security number from some source, the mere act of inventing a Social
Security number does not meet the statutory requirements of obtaining a Social
Security number nor did he have the requisite knowledge of the crime Identity
Fraud.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his conviction for Identity Fraud.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
MANUEL HURTADO RINCON,
Defendant.

Case No: 101902 812 FS
Judge:
MICHAEL DIREDA
Date:
September 9, 2011

PRESENT
Clerk:
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ProsBcutor: HEWARD, GARY R
Defendant
Defendant's. Attorney(s) : KEVIN G -RICHARDS
DEFENDANT- INFORMATION
pate of birth: June 23, 1971
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CHARGES
1. IDENTITY FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony*
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/31/2011 Guiltg

^3

so

V
*&

HEARING
Defense counsel addresses the court.
State addresses the court.
Defendant address.es the court.
Court sees no legal reason as to why sentencing should not be
imposed arid proceeds with sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant • s conviction of IDENTITY FRAUD a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate terra of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
MANUEL HURTADO-RINCON
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Case No: 101902812 Date:

Sep 09, 2011

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of IDENTITY FRAUD a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 60 day(s)
Restitution
Amount: $287.04 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: GERTRUDE WILLISON
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are.on timepay 101902812.
The defendant is to pay $287.04 monthly on the 9th.
The number of payments scheduled is 0 plus a final payment of
$288., 69,
The first payment is due on 12/09/2011 the final payment of $288.69
is due on 12/09/2011. The final payment may vary based on
interest.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Ogden District Court.
Defendant to serve 60 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or
municipal.
The defendant shall not return to the United States unless legal to
do so.
The defendant shall serve 60 days in the Weber County Jail with
credit for time served with a release to Immigrations Customs
Enforcement.
*
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $287.04 on
behalf of Gertrude Willison payable to the court^witi^a^ 90 days.
Final review 9/9/14.
Date:
MICHAEL DIREDA
District Court
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